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 This paper investigates the role of board structure and the effect of ownership structures 
on firm performance in New Zealand's listed firms. Several studies, the majority from the 
U.S., U.K. and Japan, have examined the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms, ownership structure and firm performance. Those studies yielded different 
results, affected by the nature of the prevailing governance system for each country. 
Investigating New Zealand's listed firms could enhance the diversity of the growing body 
of work that examines this relationship. Though the majority of studies only tested a 
linear relationship between variables, a number of studies have found a non-linear 
relationship between board structures, ownership structures and firm performance, and 
this study confirms the non-linear relationship. Using a balanced panel of 79 New 
Zealand listed firms, this study employs a Generalised Linear Model (GLM) for 
robustness. The result reveals that board of directors, board committees, and managerial 
ownership have a positive and significant impact on firm performance. Meanwhile, non-
executive directors, female directors on the board and blockholder ownership lower New 
Zealand firm performance. 
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The corporate governance function is intended to develop ownership structures 
and corporate governance structures for companies to ensure managers to behave 
ethically and make decisions that benefit shareholders. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) propose agency theory, which suggests that in many modern organisations 
there is separation between ownership (principal) and management (agents), and 
the separation may resulted in agency problems, including excessive 
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consumption and under-investment decisions. Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest 
that boards reduce agency conflicts by separating management from control 
aspects of the decision-making process. In the United States, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was introduced to enhance transparency and control of agency costs through 
enacting various governance requirements for listed firms.  
 
Board of directors play an important role in maintaining effective 
corporate governance, particularly in publicly held corporations in which agency 
problems may arise from the separation of ownership and control. The 
management body in a firm is responsible for suggesting and implementing 
major policies; however, shareholders do not always agree with these policies, 
which can lead to an agency problem between management and shareholders. 
The board of directors is only one of several mechanisms that can mitigate 
agency conflicts within the firm. Capital structure, insider ownership and block 
ownership are also effective in controlling agency problems. Moreover, in a 
dynamic environment, boards become very important for the smooth functioning 
of organisations. Boards are expected to perform different functions. For 
example, monitoring of management to mitigate agency costs (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), hiring and firing of 
management (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998), providing and giving access to 
resources (Hendry & Kiel, 2004), and providing strategic direction for the firm 
(Kemp, 2006). Boards also seek to protect shareholders’ interest in a competitive 
environment while maintaining managerial accountability to attain good firm 
performance (Hendry & Kiel, 2004; McIntyre, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2007). Most 
empirical studies find that board composition is affected not only by those 
corporate governance mechanisms, but also other variables, including firm size 
and firm performance. Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2002) propose that a 
good corporate governance framework can benefit the firm with easier financing, 
lower costs of capital, improved stakeholder favour, and overall better company 
performance. 
 
In 1993, the New Zealand Government made major reforms to legislation 
that governs securities. This included the reform of the Companies Act, which 
substantially increased directors' accountability. This reform was intended to 
strengthen internal control to align the interests of managers and shareholders. 
Prevost, Rao and Hossain (2002) investigated the impact of the Companies Act 
1993 on corporate governance mechanism and firm performance and found no 
impact. 
 
Several studies have examined the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership structure and firm performance across 
countries with different characteristics, with the majority in the U.S., the U.K. 
and Japan. The studies yielded different results, affected by the nature of the 
Board Structure, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance 
45 
 
prevailing governance system for each country. Investigating New Zealand's 
listed firms could add diversity to the growing body of work that examines this 
relationship. Compared with the other countries that have been studied, New 
Zealand has a smaller market, so its listed firms are likely to perform differently. 
In addition, New Zealand is dominated by small and medium enterprises and 
agriculture, which is different to other developed countries, and which may 
reflect different ownership structures, corporate governance conduct and firms' 
financial performance. Thus, it is important to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure and firms' 
financial performance in the New Zealand context. 
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) find no significant relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. They suggest that ownership 
structures differ across firms because of differences in the circumstances facing 
firms, particularly in regard to scale of economies, regulations and the 
environment stability in which they operate. Bhabra (2007) finds a significant 
non-linear relationship between ownership structure and firm performance in 
New Zealand's (N.Z.) listed firms, and suggests that the non-linear relationship is 
robust to differences in governance structures across market. In 2001, the mean 
proportion of stock held by the top 20 shareholders in N.Z. was 73%, which 
indicates that N.Z. firms are highly concentrated, hence inducing better 
monitoring and reducing the potential for entrenchment of managers (Hossain, 
Prevost, & Rao, 2001). From 2007 to 2011, the average mean proportion of stock 
held by the top 20 shareholders in N.Z. was 46.73%, and this indicates that N.Z. 
firms tend to have moderate ownership concentration. 
 
Furthermore, in recent years, Norway and France have imposed quotas 
for female representation on their boards of directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
find that more gender-diverse boards are tougher monitors; however, in firms 
with weak shareholder rights, the relationship between firm performance and 
female representation on boards is negative. A greater female representation on 
boards not only increases the size of the human capital pool from which directors 
can be drawn, but also provides some additional skills and perspectives that may 
not be possible with all-male boards. 
 
Though the impact of board structures and ownership structures on N.Z. 
firms' performance has been extensively studied in recent years, for example, 
Chin, Vos and Case (2004), Elayan, Meyer and Lau (2003), Hossain et al. (2001), 
Prevost et al. (2002), Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour and Gunasekarage (2008), and 
Reddy, Locke and Scrimgeour (2010), the results remain inconclusive. Thus, this 
study adds empirical evidence for the relationship between board composition 
and firm financial performance with more recent data, which is important to 
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observe the changes in evidence over time. Moreover, this study caters for non-
linearity making it more robust than prior research. Furthermore, it is necessary 
to empirically examine whether N.Z. firms perform better if they follow best 
practice recommendations for board characteristics. 
 
In addition, the results from this study show how board structure and 
ownership structures influence New Zealand listed firms' performance. Firms in 
New Zealand are generally smaller when compared to other developed countries 
so unquestioning compliance to different codes and principles from elsewhere is 
inappropriate for New Zealand firms. The codes and principles may have to be 
customised to fit specific needs in a New Zealand context. Lastly, this study 
provides recent evidence about which factors contribute to increasing New 
Zealand listed firms' financial performance and is the first study to address the 





Board composition consists of board demographics, board structure, board 
recruitment, board member motivation and criteria, board education and 
evaluation, and board leadership. Board composition is one of the important 
factors affecting firm financial performance. There are some previous studies on 
the relationship between board compositions and firm performance. Callen, Klein 
and Tinkelman (2003), Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003), Kang, Cheng and 
Gray (2007), and Sheridan and Milgate (2005) find that board composition is 
positively correlated with firm financial performance. Meanwhile, Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Garg (2007) and Rose (2007) find that board 
composition is inversely related to the value of the firm, because larger boards 
are likely to have higher coordination costs, which reduces their ability to 
effectively monitor management. Chaganti, Maharjan and Sharma (1985) 
compare board size between failed and successful firms and reveal that succesful 
firms tend to have bigger boards. However, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) find 
no significant relationship between board composition and performance. 
 
This study particularly focuses on various aspects of board composition 
and how they affect firm performance; for example, gender, ethnicity and age are 
part of board demographics; board size, board committees and board 
independence are part of board structure. Board size varies from board to board, 
depending on factors such as the type of the firm, the asset size and the board 
culture. Then, what is the best size for a board of directors? There are many 
opinions, academic and professional, about the ideal board number. Yet in an era 
of sustained scrutiny and the potential for more government oversight, it is more 
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important than ever for boards to revisit their size and determine the right number 
to carry out effective and responsible firm governance. 
 
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) re-examine the ideal number for a 
board by classifying firms into complex or simple firm and they find complex 
firms have larger boards than simple firms. There are some perspectives on how 
big a firm’s board size should be. From an agency perspective, it can be argued 
that a larger board is more likely to be vigilant for agency problems simply 
because a greater number of people will be reviewing management actions. From 
a resource dependence theory perspective, it can be similarly argued that a larger 
board brings greater opportunity for more links and hence access to resources. 
From a stewardship theory perspective, it is the ratio of inside to outside directors 
that is of relevance, since inside directors can bring superior information to the 
board for decision-making. Larger boards are likely to have more knowledge and 
skills at their disposal, and the abundance perspectives they assemble are likely to 
enhance cognitive conflict. Several studies have examined the impact of 
corporate governance mechanisms on firm performance across countries 
operating under different characteristics (Callen et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; 
Garg, 2007; Kang et al., 2007; Rose, 2007; Sheridan & Milgate, 2005). In the 
New Zealand context, Chin et al. (2004), Elayan et al. (2003), Hossain et al. 
(2001), Prevost et al. (2002), and Reddy et al. (2008) and Reddy et al. (2010) 
have examined the impact of corporate governance on firm performance. 
 
The number of board members is considered to be one of the factors 
affecting firm performance, but there is no one optimal size for a board. Jensen 
(1983) suggests that a board should have a maximum of seven or eight members 
to function effectively. However, Jensen (1986) also suggests that smaller boards 
enhance communication, cohesiveness and co-ordination, which make 
monitoring more effective. This proposition is backed by empirical evidence 
from the ''for profit'' literature, that shows smaller board size is associated with 
higher firm value (Eisenberg et al., 1998; Yermack, 1996). Conversely, agency 
theory and resource dependency theory could also support the proposition that 
larger board size gives a firm greater value. From an agency perspective the 
larger board size equates to more effective monitoring of management by 
reducing the domination of the CEO on the board and therefore leads to greater 
firm performance (Singh & Harianto, 1989). Resource dependency suggests that 
organisations may increase board size in order to maximise provision of 
resources for the organisation (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). There are a number of 
studies in investigating whether or not board size has an effect on firm 
performance. Coles et al. (2008) find that complex firms tend to have larger 
boards, and it is likely to increase firm performance. In contrast, Yermarck 
(1996) and Guest (2009) find an inverse relationship between board size and firm 
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performance. Hossain et al. (2001) and Reddy et al. (2008) also find similar 
results for New Zealand listed-firms. Furthermore, the median board size for 
New Zealand firms is six members which is less than what Jensen suggests for 
firms in the U.S. However, the smaller board size in New Zealand firms fits with 
its small market characteristic. Though the result is inconclusive, it is assumed 
that larger boards provide more expertise, greater management oversight and 
access to a wider range of resources; therefore to balance the skills required in the 
board room, New Zealand firms may require larger boards. 
 
  H1: There is a positive relationship between board size and firm 
                  performance. 
 
In relation to board size, Coles et al. (2008) suggest that larger boards tend 
to have more outside directors, hence numerous studies suggest that non-
executive directors have a positive effect and find that boards dominated by non-
executive directors are more likely to act in shareholders' best interests, and more 
independent boards improve performance through better monitoring of 
management (Borokhovich, Parrino, & Trapani, 1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
1988). Ezzamel and Watson (1993), and Hossain et al. (2001) find a positive 
relationship between board independence and firms’ financial performance. In 
contrast, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Klein (1998) and Bhagat and Black 
(2002) find a negative relationship between board independence and 
performance, while Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Mehran (1995) find no 
relationship between board independence and firms' performance. Monitoring the 
actions of managers is a crucial component for management effectiveness, thus 
the greater the number of non-executive directors the more likely they are to 
increase the board vigilance which minimises the agency problem and increases 
firm performance. 
 
  H2: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of non- 
         executive directors on the board and firms' performance. 
 
Gender is arguably the most debated diversity issue, not only in terms of 
board diversity, but also in politics and in other general societal situations. The 
issue of gender in board diversity is especially timely given the current 
movement in Europe to increase the number of women on boards. The concept of 
gender diversity is supported by the theoretical literature; for example, from an 
agency theory perspective, an increase in diversity will provide a balanced board 
that will ensure that no individual can dominate the decision-making (Hampel, 
1998). From a resource dependency viewpoint, the increase in board diversity 
may well provide linkages to additional resources, and from a stakeholder 
perspective, diversity provides representation for different stakeholders (Keasey, 
Thompson, & Wright, 1997). Huse and Solberg (2006) suggest that diversity 
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improves organisational value and performance through additional perspectives. 
Overall, female directors add additional skills and perspectives that are different 
from male directors. 
 
Carter, Simkins and Simpson (2003) examine the relationship between 
board diversity and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms. They find a statistically 
significant positive relationship between the fraction of women or minorities on 
the board and firm value. Similarly, Jurkus, Park and Woodard (2008) investigate 
gender diversity in the top management of Fortune 500 firms and find that gender 
diversity is positively associated with both performance and stock valuation. 
Carter et al. (2003) and Bonn (2004) provide empirical evidence to support the 
view that increased gender diversity has a positive relationship with firm value. 
Kang et al. (2007) examined the extent of board diversity and independence in 
the top 100 Australian corporations in 2003 and the influential factors involved. 
The main findings of their research on the extent of diversity relating to gender, 
the age of directors, and independence in Australia's largest listed companies, 
reveal mixed results. In the case of gender, it is important to note that 33 
companies (from a sample of 100 companies) did not have a female director. 
While 51 companies had one female director, only 15 companies had two or 
more female directors. Significantly, only 10.37% of the total director positions 
in Australia's top companies are occupied by females. Furthermore, only the level 
of shareholding concentration was found to be a significant factor in determining 
gender diversity. 
 
It has been suggested that there are two advantages in having women on 
boards. First, women are not part of the ''old boys'' network, which allows them 
to be more independent. Second, they may have a better understanding of 
consumer behaviour, the needs of customers, and opportunities for companies in 
meeting those needs (Brennan & McCafferty, 1997). Women currently make up 
only 12.5% of board memberships in the UK and Australia. Meanwhile, 9.3% of 
directors in New Zealand are women though women make up nearly 50% of the 
New Zealand workforce (Women on Boards, 2012). The New Zealand Securities 
Commission (NZSC) is trying to push the representation of female directors on 
boards. The NZSC requires all listed-companies to declare the number of women 
on their boards from the 2012 fiscal year (Waikato Times, 2012). Furthermore, 
other countries have taken various actions. Norway, Iceland and Spain have 
quotas of 40% female representation on boards, and France has proposed a 
similar quota. Meanwhile, New Zealand has not joined the international trend to 
push for more female directors (Slade, 2011).  
 
  H3: There is a positive relationship between the proportions of female  
                  board directors and firm performance. 
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Board members are also part of committees, therefore, it is beneficial to 
examine various aspects of committees. The NZSC (2004) recommends that 
companies have audit committees and remuneration committees to oversee the 
audit of financial statements and to set up remuneration for executive officers and 
directors. The committees are important to ensure that the financial procedure is 
carried out well and the directors are appropriately compensated, hence 
mitigating any agency problems. Findings from this study will improve our 
understanding of linkage between committees, agency problems and firm 
performance. Felo, Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003) empirically examine the 
relationship between expertise, independence, the size of audit committees and 
the quality of financial reporting. They find that expertise and size are positively 
related to financial reporting quality but are not related to committee 
independence. They state that given the prior evidence of a negative relationship 
between financial reporting quality and cost of capital, firms could improve their 
reporting quality by appropriately structuring their audit committees, thus 
reducing their cost of capital. The presence of audit committees in public 
corporate entities has a positive effect on reducing agency cost when measured 
by cost to revenue (Reddy et al., 2010). Furthermore, an effective nomination 
committee should ensure the appointment of non-executive directors whose 
interests are aligned with those of the shareholders and reduce any agency 
problems.  
 
   H4: There is a positive relationship between audit committee and firm 
                    performance. 
   H5: There is a positive relationship between nomination committee and 
                   firm performance. 
   H6: There is a positive relationship between remuneration committee and  
                    firm performance. 
 
The relationship between ownership structure and firm performance has 
been the subject of interest in the literature. There are mixed results on how 
ownership structure impacts on firm performance. Most of the empirical results 
were derived from developed countries such as the U.S. and U.K. However, 
differences in prevailing institutional, legal and economic influences between the 
U.S. and other countries resulted in different impacts of ownership structure on 
firm performance. According to the agency model, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
argue that there is a convergence of interests between shareholders and managers 
as the managers' ownership increases, and thus higher managerial ownership 
should reduce agency costs and hence increase firm performance. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) find a significant 
relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, 
Demsetz (1983) implies that the increased level of insider ownership may reduce 
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corporate performance. This notion is classified as the entrenchment hypothesis, 
an explanation of which is offered by Stulz (1988), who argue that in situations 
with a low level of managerial ownership, firm value will increase because rights 
to transfer control will be more formally vested with insiders. Further, insiders 
are more organised than diffused shareholders and will have a greater probability 
of securing high premiums in the case of takeovers. 
 
  H7: There is a positive relationship between managerial ownership and 
         firm performance. 
 
The role of blockholders is likely to vary over time periods and countries 
as a function of the legal system and other regulations. Blockholders may directly 
influence dividend policy, and managerial ownership may directly influence 
capital structure policy. However, more complicated interaction effects are 
possible and perhaps more likely; for example, when there is a large stakeholder, 
management usually becomes less accountable to shareholders and more 
accountable to the large controlling stakeholder who will have considerable 
control over the firm in excess of the cash flow rights. This may reduce the 
incentive to expropriate funds but not eliminate it. 
 
In 2001, the mean proportion of stock held by the top 20 shareholders in 
N.Z. was 73%, which indicates that New Zealands firms are highly concentrated, 
which consequently induces better monitoring and reduces the potential for 
entrenchment of managers (Hossain et al., 2001). Similarly, Healy (2003) found 
that institutional ownership and external block holding in N.Z. counts for 69%, 
and suggests that higher institutional ownership implies greater monitoring. 
Furthermore, the average mean proportion of stock held by the blockholders in 
N.Z., during the period 2007 to 2011, was 50% with maximum value 98.88%, 
which indicates that the institutional ownership is widely dispersed and hence 
better monitoring takes place. 
 
Some studies find that blockholders' ownership is likely to reduce agency 
costs. Hartzell and Starks (2003) report that blockholders' ownership is positively 
related to the performance sensitivity of managerial compensation; thus, 
blockholders' ownership monitoring tends to be complementary to incentive 
compensation systems, mitigating agency problems between shareholders and 
managers. On the other hand, Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) argue that 
blockholders have neither the time nor expertise to act as effective monitors. 
Furthermore, Singh and Davidson (2003) find no evidence that blockholders' 
ownership affects agency costs.  
 
H8: There is a positive relationship between blockholders' ownership and 
       firm performance. 




 Data and Variables 
 
This study uses data from the annual report of New Zealand listed firms for the 
period of 2007–2011, collected from the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) 
deep archive. Those firms with any missing observations for any variable in the 
model during the research period are dropped, and thus a balanced panel data of 
79 New Zealand listed firms were observed, from total of 147. Those 79 firms are 
from six industries classifications; primary, energy, goods, property, service and 
investment. Though only 79 firms were included, the sample will suffice in 
capturing aggregate leverage in the country because the listed firms can be used 
to represent the whole industry in New Zealand. 
 
The dependent variable is firm performance, which is measured by 
Tobin's Q and Return on Assets (ROA). Tobin's Q mixes market value with 
accounting value in many studies (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999; 
McConnel & Servaes, 1990; Zeitun & Tian, 2007). ROA is an accounting-based 
performance measure (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) and is included for 
robustness. The explanatory variables are the number of directors on the board, 
the number of non-executive directors on the boards, the number of female 
directors on the board, audit committee, nomination committee, remuneration 
committee, managerial ownership and block holders' ownership. Leverage, firm 
size and industry level are used as control variables, as it is important to control 
for the possibility of spurious correlation between board structures, ownership 
structure and firm performance that stems from an industry effect. 
 
To examine the effect of board size, this study uses the total number of 
board members (Bonn, 2004; Yermack, 1996). A non-executive director is 
measured as the proportion of non-executive directors on the board. Gender 
diversity is measured as the proportion of female directors on the board (Carter et 
al., 2003). Board committees are classified into three committees; audit 
committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee. These board 
committees are measured using a dummy variable; every committee takes value 1 
if the firms have each committee otherwise it is 0.  Managerial ownership is 
measured as the percentage of managers as equity shareholders (Demsetz & 
Villalonga, 2001). Further, the managerial ownership is classified into three 
groups; inside ownership concentration 1, inside ownership concentration 2 and 
inside ownership concentration 3. The average inside ownership is 16.4%. To 
determine the group classification, the lower bound and upper bound 10% is 
used, thus the inside ownership concentration 1 is less than 15.4%, the ownership 
concentration 2 is a range of 15.4% to 17.4% and the ownership concentration 3 
is greater than 17.4%. This classification is arbitrary and is justified based on the 
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average insider ownership finding. Blockholders' ownership is measured as the 




This study uses panel data, which allows the unobservable heterogeneity for each 
observation in the sample to be eliminated and multicollinearity among variables 
to be alleviated. Maddala and Lahiri (2009) specify problems that might be 
present in the regression model, such as heteroskedasticity, multicollinearity and 
endogeneity problems. Those problems cause inconsistency in the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) estimates. 
 
As can be seen in Table 1, most cross-correlations for the independent 
variables are fairly small, therefore giving less cause for concern about the 
multicollinearity problem. Furthermore, the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroskedasticity results in 176.81 (p-value 0.000), indicating that variances 
among the explanatory variables are not constant. In addition, the skewness and 
kurtosis result indicates that the data has non-normal distribution. 
 
               Table 1 
               Heteroskedasticy and normality tests 
Source Chi2 df p 
Heteroskedasticity 176.81 20 0.0000 
Skewness 62.07 5 0.0000 
Kurtosis 5.20 1 0.0226 
Total 244.08 26 0.0000 
 
While endogeneity is prevalent across many aspects of corporate finance, 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is likely to 
be infiltrated with the endogeneity problem (Bhagat & Black, 1999; Denis & 
Sarin, 1999; Coles et al., 2008, Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2009). It is important 
that endogeneity is taken into account as the presence of unobserved influences is 
likely to generate a degree of correlation between regressors and the error terms, 
which leads to biased estimates of the regressors' coefficients. Theory and 
empirical work suggest that corporate governance is dynamically endogenous 
with respect to firm performance. Furthermore, in previous work in the New 
Zealand context done by Hossain et al. (2001), the endogeneity problem is not 
addressed as they state that endogeneity in corporate governance is unclear as to 
which variables are endogenous/exogenous, hence they affirm that ordinary least 
square is a more appropriate method. Moreover, though Reddy et al. (2010) 
address the endogeneity problem in their New Zealand study, which they 
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explained that the endogeneity is caused by an inverse relationship; however, 
justifications provided are inadequate. Wintoki et al. (2009) assert that any type 
of endogeneity, such as past performance, simultaneity and unobservable 
heterogeneity, is likely to be present between board structure and firm 
performance. In contrast to Wintoki et al. (2009), using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test for endogeneity, this study confirms no endogeneity. The different results of 
the endogeneity test in this study and previous studies may be due to different 
observation/data characteristics, different corporate governance practices and 
different institutional factors; most of those previous studies were based on U.S. 
firms. Thus the result of the endogeneity test in this study cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. 
 
Though the majority of studies only tested the linear relationship between 
variables, a number of studies have found a non-linear relationship between 
board composition, ownership and performance (McConnell & Servaes, 1990; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Holderness, Kroszner, & Sheehan, 1999; Morck et 
al., 1988), and this study confirms the non-linearity, using a non-linearity test, 
with results of 8.45 with p-value 0.4896, which means the null hypothesis of non-
linearity cannot be rejected. Therefore, to address the non-linearity problem in 
the data, this study uses a non-linear model, Generalised Linear Models (GLM), 
as they may yield a more efficient and unbiased estimator (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2010). According to Cameron and Trivedi (2010), GLM are essentially 
generalisations of non-least square, hence it is optimal for a non-linear regression 
model with homoskedastic additive errors, but also appropriate for other types of 
data where there is not only intrinsic heteroskedasticity but also a natural starting 
point for modelling the intrinsic heteroskedasticity. The GLM estimator  
maximises the linear-exponential-family (LEF) log likelihood 
 
                                          (1) 
 
where m(x, β) = e(y|x) is the conditional mean of y, different specified forms of 
the functions a(.) and c(.) correspond to different members of the LEF, and b(.) is 
a normalising constant.  
 
The regression model is specified as: 
 
FPit = β0 + BSit + NEDit + FDit + Audit + Nomit + Remit + BOWNPSit + IOWNPSit  









FV = Firm performance 
BS = Directors on the board 
NED = Non-executive directors on the board 
FD = Female directors on the board 
Aud = Audit committee 
Nom = Nomination committee 
Rem = Remuneration committee 
BOWNPS = Blockholder ownership 
IOWNPS = Inside ownership 
IOWNPS1 = Inside ownership concentration 1 
IOWNPS2 = Inside ownership concentration 2 
OWNPS3 = Inside ownership concentration 3 





Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables. The mean value of firm 
performance is 0.1293 with a range from 0.0001 to 8.4280, suggesting that the 
majority of firms have low performance. A Tobins' Q value from 0 to 1 is 
considered as a low performance, and it may indicate that the stock is 
undervalued. Board size in New Zealand listed firms' ranges from 3 to 12 
directors, with 6 being the average, suggesting that most New Zealand listed 
firms have sufficient directors. The range of non-executive directors sitting on 
boards is from three to nine, with an average of four. When compared to the 
average board size of six, the number of non-executive directors appears to be 
adequate at 50%. The number of female directors sitting on boards is one or two; 
the average is one, or 17% of board composition. This lower representation of 
female directors suggests that the involvement of women is still rare in New 
Zealand listed firms. The figure is lower than the proportion in the U.S. (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Simpson, Carter, & D'Souza, 2010). The mean value for 
blockholder ownership is 50.04%, suggesting that the blockholder owernship in 
New Zealand is moderate. The presence of blockholders has similar benefits to 
those of ownership concentration in providing supervision and monitoring, 
however, a problem arises when blockholders extract personal benefit at the 
expense of minority shareholders and other stakeholders. Thus, the moderate 
proportion of blockholder ownership in New Zealand listed firms is beneficial to 
the firm as it can overcome the agency problem and increase firm performance. 
The mean value for managerial ownership is 17.86%, suggesting that the 
managerial ownership in New Zealand is moderately high as other studies 
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classify the managerial ownership at 5% to 20% as moderate, while below 5% is 
classified as low and above 20% as high managerial ownership.  
 
Table 2 
 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tobins’ Q 395 0.1293 0.8286 0.0001 8.4280 
ROA 395 0.0408 0.0583 -0.3903 0.2716 
Board Size 395 6.0767 0.1249 3.0000 12.000 
Non-Executive Directors 395 4.1990 0.1996 3.0000 9.0000 
Female Directors 395 1.0025 0.1050 1.0000 2.0000 
Audit Committee 395 0.9114 0.2845 0.0000 1.0000 
Nomination Committee 395 0.5266 0.4999 0.0000 1.0000 
Remuneration Committee 395 0.7646 0.4248 0.0000 1.0000 
Blockholder Ownership 395 0.5004 0.3254 0.0001 0.9886 
Inside Ownership 395 0.1786 0.2455 0.0000 0.9770 
Inside Ownership_Concentration 1 395 0.6785 0.4677 0.0000 1.0000 
Inside Ownership_Concentration 2 395 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Inside Ownership_Concentration 3 395 0.3012 0.4594 0.0000 1.0000 
Leverage 395 0.4778 0.2414 0.0100 0.9900 
Firm Size 395 5.5184 1.2742 2.7945 9.7071 
Industry Primary 395 0.1519 0.3594 0.0000 1.0000 
Industry Energy 395 0.0759 0.2653 0.0000 1.0000 
Industry Goods 395 0.1772 0.3823 0.0000 1.0000 
Industry Property 395 0.0633 0.2438 0.0000 1.0000 
Industry Service 395 0.4177 0.4938 0.0000 1.0000 
Industry Investment 395 0.1013 0.3026 0.0000 1.0000 
 
The mean value of leverage is 0.47, with a range of 0 to 0.99, suggesting 
that all firms have leverage close to the average leverage of industry. According 
to Statistics New Zealand (2004), New Zealand's firms utilised debt rather than 
equity financing, which accounts for 72% total debt compared to Australian firms 
which utilised only 25% of debt financing in 2003 (Welch, 2003). In addition, the 
average total debt utilised by New Zealand's firm accounts for 45%, which is 
close to the range of the average total debt for most developed countries in the 
1990s, being 50% to 60% (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Comparing two different 
periods might be unproductive or unreliable, therefore, based on recent studies by 
Bessler, Drobetz and Gruninger (2011), the average total debt for all firms in the 
world is 25%, for non-U.S. firms it is 26%, for U.S. firms 23%, for common law 
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countries 25% and for civil law countries 27%; based on this, it seems New 
Zealand firms use of debt financing is above the average. 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation between Tobin's Q and independent 
variables and Table 4 presents the correlation between ROA and independent 
variables. Apart from non-executive directors, female directors and blockholder 
ownership, all independent variables exhibits a positive correlation with Tobin's 
Q, indicating that a higher proportion of non-executive directors, a higher the 
proportion of female directors and higher proportion of blockholder ownership 
effect a decrease in firm performance in N.Z. firms. Furthermore, apart from 
female directors and blockholder ownership, all independent variables exhibits a 
positive correlation with ROA, indicating the higher the proportion of female 
directors and a higher proportion of blockholder ownership effect a decrease in 
firm performance amongst New Zealand firms. From all variables, only audit 
committee and remuneration committee yield the highest correlation, which is 
close to 0.6000. None of the remaining variables are correlated to an extent that 
merits noting. Further, low correlation among explanatory variables indicates no 
dependency among them, thus indicating low likelihood of multicollinearity in 
the OLS regressions.  
 
Table 5 presents the regression results for Tobin's Q and ROA. For 
Tobin's Q, the board size coefficient exhibits a significant and positive 
relationship with firm performance, which supports the agency and resource 
dependency theory that larger board size creates greater firm value and hence 
supports the testable hypotheses. This result contrasts with those studies done by 
Hossain et al. (2001) for the N.Z. context, and Yermack (1996), Bhagat and 
Black (2002) for the U.S. context. The contradictory results are caused by the 
data characteristics and different methods employed. The result indicates that 
large boards improve N.Z. firm performance, as large boards provide greater 
monitoring, increase the independence of the board and counteract the 
managerial entrenchment, hence increasing firm performance (Coles et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, the positive coefficient of board size suggests that large boards are 
an effective mechanism for monitoring manager performance and achieving 
long-term strategic goals in New Zealand firms. Similar to the result for Tobin's 
Q, the board size coefficient for ROA yields a significant and positive 
relationship with firm performance, suggesting that the greater the board size, the 
higher the firm performance. Overall, the board size coefficients for Tobin's Q 

















 Regression results 
Variables Tobins' Q ROA 
Constant -1.3877** (0.6620) 0.0019* (0.1928) 
Board Size 0.2443** (0.3329) 0.0380** (0.0177) 
Non-Executive Directors -0.4568** (0.1989) 0.0492*** (0.0086) 
Female Directors -0.3521* (0.3993) -0.0159* (0.0207) 
Audit Committee 0.8361*** (0.1660) 0.0323*** (0.0101) 
Nomination Committee 0.1439 (0.0990) 0.0154*** (0.0048) 
Remuneration Committee 0.7270*** (0.1277) 0.0269*** (0.0057) 
Blockholder Ownership -0.3130*** (0.1026) -0.0049* (0.0042) 
Inside Ownership 0.0255** (0.3241) 0.0029* (0.0172) 
Inside Ownership_Concentration 1 0.0245** (0.2387) 0.0110* (0.0095) 
Inside Ownership_Concentration 2 (Omitted) (Omitted) 
Inside Ownership_Concentration 3 -0.0148** (0.2461) -0.0087* (0.0091) 
                                                                                                             (Continue on next page) 
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Table 5 (Continued) 
Variables Tobins' Q ROA 
Leverage 0.0921 (0.1563) 0.0021 (0.0070) 
Firm Size 0.2241*** (0.0445) 0.0081* (0.0020) 
Industry_Primary 0.3286 (0.4753) 0.0096 (0.1973) 
Industry_Energy 0.0400 (0.4911) 0.1764 (0.2047) 
Industry_Goods 0.4478 (0.4739) 0.0166 (0.1962) 
Industry_Property 1.2522*** (0.5031) 0.0178 (0.2076) 
Industry_Service 0.3127 (0.4628) 0.0311 (0.1924) 
Industry_Investment 0.4591 (0.4918) 0.0104 (0.2012) 
    
Groups 79 79 
Wald-Chi2 186.84 105.10 
Prob.Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses are for coefficients. *sig. at 10% level, **sig. at 5% level, and 
***sig. at 1% level 
 
The coefficient for non-executive directors for Tobin's Q is negative and 
significant, suggesting that the greater the number of non-executive directors on 
the board the lower the firm performance. The result for this study is similar to 
one done by Bhagat and Bolton (2008) for a U.S. context but is in contrast with 
studies done by Hossain et al. (2001) and Reddy et al. (2010) for a New Zealand 
context. They find a non-significant effect of non-executive directors on firm 
performance. However, though the result found by Reddy is not significant, it has 
negative coefficient which is similar to the coefficient yielded in this study. The 
negative coefficient of non-executive directors shows that compliance with 
NZSC recommendations has increased costs which have a negative effect on 
firms' financial performance. In contrast with the result for Tobin's Q, the non-
executive directors' coefficient for ROA is positive and significant. The different 
result is likely due to the different measurement; the market-based measure and 
accounting-based measure. The negative relationship between non-executive 
directors and firm performance may be caused by the very high blockholders 
ownership concentration which can interfere with effective corporate governance 
of the firm, and as a consequence, the non-executive directors may not play a 
pivotal role in effective governance of the firm. 
 
Generally, greater female representation on boards not only increases the 
size of the human capital pool from which directors can be drawn, but also 
provides some additional skills and perspectives that may not be possible with 
all-male boards. However, the female director coefficient exhibits a significant 
and negative relationship with firm performance both for Tobin's Q and ROA, 
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which does not support agency and resource dependency theories that an increase 
in diversity mitigates domination of decision making processes and encourages 
diversity of viewpoint, and hence this study rejects the testable hypotheses. The 
result indicates that there appears to be no New Zealand evidence of the 
effectiveness of female directors' impact on firm performance. Furthermore, there 
is a regular stream of media commentary suggesting that New Zealand firms are 
laggards when it comes to appointing females. 
 
Using Tobin's Q, the audit committee and remuneration committee yield 
a significant and positive relationship with firm performance; the nomination 
committee form does not. Meanwhile, for ROA, all committees exhibit a positive 
and significant relationship with firm performance. Overall, the board 
committees show a positive and significant relationship with firm performance, 
suggesting the existence of the board committee increases firm performance. 
Board committees are seen to be an important mechanism for reducing agency 
costs, hence improving firm performance, and the results also support the view 
that compliance with NZSC requirements improved firm financial performance.  
 
The blockholder ownership coefficient yields a significant and negative 
relationship with firm performance (Tobin's Q and ROA), indicating that the 
higher the blockholder ownership the lower the firm performance. This result is 
similar to the work of Fitzsimons (1997) and Hossain et al. (2001) and might be 
caused by the nature of ownership in New Zealand, where the higher the 
ownership level, the more potential there is for agency problems, and the 
excessive ownership concentration in the New Zealand corporate environment 
may be detrimental to firm performance. The managerial ownership coefficient 
exhibits a significant and positive relationship with firm performance (Tobin's Q 
and ROA), suggesting that the higher the managerial ownership, the higher the 
firm performance. Furthermore, this result is similar to the work of Hossain et al. 
(2001). The result supports the agency model theory that higher managerial 
ownership should reduce agency costs and hence increases firm performance, and 
therefore it can be regarded as one of the effective mechanisms for mitigating 
agency problems in New Zealand firms Furthermore, apart from the coefficient 
for managerial ownership concentration group 1, the coefficients for managerial 
ownership concentration group 2 and group 3 are negative, suggesting that at 
some point higher managerial ownership may be detrimental to New Zealand 
firms' performance. 
 
Overall, the findings indicated that New Zealand firms have good 
governance practices, such as the number of directors and board committees 
(audit, remuneration and nomination committee). Results show that apart from 
non-executive directors, female directors, and blockholder ownership, all 
variables have a significant effect on firms' financial performance across two 
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financial measures (Tobin's Q and ROA). The reason could be that non-executive 
directors and female directors on board are appointed solely to fulfil the NZSC 
recommendations and they may lack knowledge about the company/industry and 





In order to improve boards' performance, the Institute of Directors in New 
Zealand has released a code of practice for directors to guide them in performing 
their duties in accordance with New Zealand's legal requirements and the 
Institute of Directors' standards.  In addition, the New Zealand Securities 
Commission has proposed a set of nine principles and guidelines on best 
corporate governance practices (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004). 
Though these principles are used by many firms, they are non-binding in nature 
and the impact of these principles on New Zealand firms is yet to be examined. 
Thus, this paper is an attempt to empirically test the impact of board composition 
and ownership structures on firm performance in the New Zealand context, by 
examining a recent dataset of New Zealand-listed firms. Endogeneity is expected 
to be present between corporate governance and firm performance. Using the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity, this study confirms no endogeneity. 
Results suggest that the endogeneity problem documented in the U.S. context is 
unlikely to be present in New Zealand during the period of study. Furthermore, 
most of the previous New Zealand studies address no endogeneity; for example, 
the study done by Hossain et al. (2001). Finally, this study confirms a non-linear 
relationship among variables by fitting a GLM that nests models advanced in 
previous research by Morck et al. (1988), Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and 
Holderness et al. (1999). The GLM regression reveals that the board of directors, 
female directors on the board, managerial ownership, leverage and firm size 
exhibit a significant impact on N.Z. firms' performance. 
 
Overall, large boards improve N.Z. firms' performance, as large boards 
provide greater monitoring, increase the independence of the board and 
counteract the managerial entrenchment, hence increasing firm performance. The 
board committees and managerial ownership exhibit a positive and significant 
relationship with firm performance, suggesting the existence of the board 
committee and higher managerial ownership increase firm performance. The 
results support the view that compliance with NZSC requirements improves firm 
financial performance. The board committees and managerial ownership exhibit a 
positive and significant relationship with firm performance, suggesting the 
existence of the board committee and higher managerial ownership increase firm 
performance. The results support the view that compliance with NZSC 
Fitriya Fauzi and Stuart Locke 
62 
requirements improves firm financial performance. A higher proportion of non-
executive directors, female directors on N.Z. boards and a higher proportion of 
blockholder ownership decrease firm performance. This result might be caused 
by the nature of ownership in New Zealand, in which the higher the blockholder 
ownership level, the more potential for agency problem to arise as consequence 
of more power to interfere with any decision made by the board.  
 
It should be noted that this study has only covered the period from 2007 
to 2011, with a sample of 79 firms out of New Zealand listed firms; hence, the 
validity of the findings interpreted in this study is limited to the scope of the data 
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